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Of Enclaves and Internet: How Social Media Affects Political Participation in Authoritarian States 
By Andrew Keller 
In 1962, Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan proclaimed that the emergence of worldwide 
telecommunications would transform the planet into a ‘global village’ of sorts, constructing ties among 
peoples who had never before been able to interact and who perhaps did not know of each other’s 
existence. This was prior to the emergence of the internet—a phenomenon that has drawn even greater 
praise from optimistic futurists. Some even claim that the internet is ushering in a new cosmopolitan 
age, which will weaken ties to the nation-state as it forges transnational identities rooted in a common 
humanity. 
While this new age has yet to emerge, many praise the potential power of internet discourse to 
derail authoritarianism. The arrival of social media (blogging, chat forums, Facebook, twitter, and so on) 
has raised the possibility that discussion among disparate peoples online can lead to new ideas, a more 
informed citizenry, and, consequently, greater mass political participation. Many, however, do not share 
this bleary-eyed cyber-optimism, insisting, instead, that online interactions, like many varieties of 
human interactions, can be marred by the less-logical and more group-oriented sides of the brain. 
According to this pessimistic view, the internet threatens to increase group identification, reinforce 
preexisting ideas, and even enhance the ferocity with which some cling to ignorance—and this is just 
with respect to western-style liberal democracies (Morozov 2009). The claim here is that the internet is 
creating, in effect, a “post-fact society”: a fact-resistant world, in which everything and its opposite 
appear “true enough” and how we “feel” about things matters more than the facts. 
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Bringing authoritarian states into the picture further muddles the situation. Media control in 
these countries suggests that internet communication should serve only as an extension of official party 
dialogue. In many cases, however, proponents of cyber-cosmopolitanism and cyber-democracy may still 
argue that, given at least minimal freedom with respect to free discussion online, the internet will have 
similar (if not, entirely the same) democratizing effects within authoritarian states. In recent years, this 
argument has gained some empirical muscle to support it. Twitter’s most recent media spotlight took 
place not in the developed world but in the Middle East and Maghreb, where it was used to foment the 
Arab Spring revolutions in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and now Syria. But did Twitter help cause these 
uprisings or did it simply channel pre-existing passions? Do social media and online interaction help 
derail dictators or do they provide authoritarian leaders with still more transmission belts for their 
propaganda? In short, do the effects of social media strengthen or weaken the ideological power of an 
authoritarian system? 
Few people ask this as strongly as the members of the Chinese Communist Party. Since the 
internet arrived in the Middle Kingdom in the early 90s, the party has been asking itself, as per Deng 
Xiaoping, just how many proverbial flies they will have to swat with their digital fresh air. To prevent the 
possibility that the internet could weaken its rule, the party has enacted one of the most extensive 
systems of internet surveillance in the world (Yang 2003). But like its uncouth hybrid of ‘market 
socialism’, its internet censorship policy is not the airtight monolith that one would expect. Despite the 
extreme chilling effect that the internet police have in online discourse in China, the Chinese still possess 
a robust and active online discussion life. By the end of 2008, the total number of internet users in China 
reached 298 million, at an annual growth rate of 41.9 percent (Li 2009). In addition, there were 117.6 
million mobile phone netizens connected to broadband networks around the country. And this 
population is young and growing; about two-thirds of netizens were between the ages of 10 and 29 (Li 
2009).   
4 
 
While entertainment, shopping, and work are all functions of the internet, a robust online 
discussion life still exists in China, and it consists of exactly the types of communities that cyber-
optimists point to in their research. Approximately 80 million blogs exist in China today, and while many 
of them have no political nature whatsoever, they still create an online civil society that has allowed 
such discussion to appear spontaneously in the past (Wang 2012). A good deal of politically sensitive 
material, as long as it isn’t too inflammatory, actually tends to go uncensored, contrary to popular 
western images of China (Christensen 2011). This phenomenon exists for a number of reasons. In part, it 
is due both to the inability and unwillingness of the party to censor opinions that, in reality, are just 
more radical extensions of their own ideas. On the other hand, it is also due to the fact that Chinese 
netizens continuously find ways to trump their own ‘Great Firewall’, constructing slang and digital 
backdoors that allow an underground discussion scene to flourish in the PRC (Wang 2012). And finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, it is due to the fact that Chinese censors tend to attack calls for action 
rather than the very pervasive criticisms of the government that exist online, allowing a discussion 
culture to grow and thrive (King et. Al 2012). Due to the vast number of internet users emerging, the 
authoritarian nature of the government, and the importance of nationalism to modern day China, it 
seems that the People’s Republic is, then, a perfect fit to test these media theories in the shadow of 
authoritarianism. 
This paper, simply put then, will examine the question of how social media affects public opinion 
and political participation in the context of contemporary Chinese media politics. I will make the case 
that China is, in fact, a good test candidate for the two, and then will proceed to show how the 
development of an online civil society through the PRC’s stunted version of social media has affected 
both Chinese public opinion and Chinese political participation through its particular version of 
information exchange. To do this, I will examine a number of primary instances of ‘public opinion in 
action’, or instances of political participation among the populace that are meant to convey large scale 
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public opinion to the elites, and which arose spontaneously through participation in an online civil 
society. These instances include the anti-Japanese Senkaku Islands protests (both in 2005 and 2012), the 
2008 foreign boycotts during the Beijing Olympics, and reactions to the coverage of the Tibet protests in 
the Western world. In the end, after examining the evidence, I will argue for the conclusion that, given 
the abounding evidence for a degree of Enclave Extremism, the Chinese blogosphere acts, in many ways, 
as an informal ideological censor in itself.  
I) Elaborating on the Media Theories 
There are two theories on how social media affects public opinion that we will be examining here, 
both aforementioned; the theory that online interactions can decrease group identification, produce 
new ideas outside the party line, and lead to democratization, and the idea that the internet can be a 
breeding ground for misinformation that reinforces pre-existing ideas and group identification.    
 The first camp is that of the ‘Google Doctrine’ theories, so-called due to their emphasis on the 
importance of open search and discussion in fostering democracy (Morozov 2009). These theories 
encompass theories of internet democracy, cosmopolitanism, and liberalization, and state, obviously, 
that the internet acts as a catalyst to help society achieve all of the above. While none of these theories 
claim that the internet actually ‘causes’ any of these things, what they all share in common is the belief 
that, by creating an area where people can take discussion into their own hands, online social media 
provides a forum to create new ideas, which people can then ‘shop’ between, gaining new insight and 
producing political activity and change. Such media theories fall under the umbrella of the ‘marketplace 
of ideas’ theory, which submits that an open market of ideas is the best way to maintain an informed 
citizenry. (Downing 2004) 
Theories of internet cosmopolitanism are, in a sense, the first theories of the internet’s effects 
on political information exchange and participation, due to their longstanding, tacit acceptance as fact in 
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some sectors public discourse. As far back as 2000, when social media was hardly even a thing yet, Bill 
Clinton was comparing internet censorship to ‘nailing Jello to a wall’, and his statements were echoed by 
politicians and pundits alike (Morozov 2009).  
On the academic side, this class of theories has tended to get backing from those who were 
advocates of the marketplace of ideas theories in the traditional media playing field. The theories differ 
in how this process will actually occur, however, with some espousing a slower evolution than others. 
Rebecca MacKinnon, former CNN correspondent and China pundit, though not, strictly speaking, an 
advocate of these theories, has explained and, at times, espoused a slower theory which links the 
development of Chinese internet cosmopolitanism to the slow development of civil society (MacKinnon 
2007). According to her, and to those that share her camp, online discourse does not produce political 
dissent directly, but instead creates a somewhat more informed citizenry which is accustomed to 
sharing and debating information, especially related to politics. Over time, therefore, this generation will 
push the envelope more and more, and will finally react when there comes an incident where this 
privilege they have been used to all their lives is denied. She couples this observation with the fact that 
the World Internet Project currently estimates that the internet has a “significantly much stronger 
effect” on China than it does on other countries, and that, as the number of internet users in China 
increases exponentially, this power will only deepen (MacKinnon 2007). This observation is taken from 
the elasticity that Chinese civil society has displayed in adapting to internet technology. According to 
Columbia University professor Guobin Yang, Chinese civil society, due to its incipient nature, is more 
adaptive to technological change, and therefore will rely more heavily on the internet when it comes to 
things such as civil society discussions. Due to this fact, he suggests, the internet will become more 
strongly engrained in Chinese society as a tool of discussion, creating a culture of discussion, he 
suggests, that is difficult to shut down when push comes to shove (Yang 2009). 
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Another side of the Google Doctrine theories relates the potential power of the Chinese internet 
to what happened with former Soviet Republics during what were termed the ‘color revolutions’. 
Theories of this type often compare the Chinese internet to new communications technologies, such as 
radio, taking root under the Soviet Union, and state that the same effect may happen with China. As 
defined by Evgeny Morozov in his book “The Net Delusion”, this class of theories states that the internet 
is a tool for democracy simply because, due to the virtue of its communication being so difficult to nail 
down, regardless of whatever censorship an authoritarian state places on it, if people have some access 
to the internet, they will necessarily produce new ideas and, most frequently, that those ideas will 
resemble liberal, western ideals (Morozov 2009). Because the internet allows for the discussion and 
production of new ideas, the ‘Google Doctrine’ states, it will necessarily produce ideas that are different 
from those of the ruling party, and that this, in itself, will upset the ideological balance. The title of the 
‘Google Doctrine’ is meant to reflect the importance of open search and exchange of information that 
the internet carries with it, and for the rest of the paper I will refer to the cyber-optimist theories as 
playing a part in this ‘Google Doctrine’. From the minute that the internet comes into play, these 
theories state, people, as they have the ability to take discussion and learning into their own hands, 
crafting new ideas that are different from those espoused by the official party line due to a newfound 
freedom of association that wasn’t there before. Therefore, this creates a threat to the ruling party, and 
helps engender the creation of democracy (Morozov 2009). 
As well, whereas civil society gatherings and activities are easily banned in the physical realm in 
authoritarian systems, internet activities are not as easy to control. While censorship is still common on 
many chat boards in China, experienced Chinese netizens understand how to either bypass the censored 
areas, or how to communicate in code with each other so as to avoid being caught. In this way, 
information transfer continues despite the active efforts to suppress it (Wang 2012). 
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Google Doctrine theories look for contrary viewpoints to what is expressed by the primary or 
‘mainstream’ source of information, such as the government, or for the spontaneous emergence of 
activism or protest online. Though in authoritarian states, it is admitted that these things may be smaller 
or more covert in nature. These things, to cyber optimists, suggest an emerging civil society that is able 
to organize itself both intellectually and physically in a realm independent of government intervention. 
This, therefore, is what we will look for in observing the processes of Google Doctrine style theories at 
work.  
The second theory, obviously, states that social media has the tendency to do quite the opposite. 
This class of theories is best anchored by the work of former Obama administration official Cass 
Sunstein. Sunstein’s theory, which I will refer to as the theory of ‘Enclave Extremism’, due to its popular 
coinage as such in his article “The Polarization of Extremes”, is useful here because it takes a middle of 
the road representation of many theories that already predict that the internet engenders groupthink in 
both the private and the political sphere. It is, in reality, a combination of theories, including those that 
suggest that internet anonymity is the problem, theories that suggest that we filter out conflicting 
information on the internet, and theories that suggest that the internet is a breeding ground for rumors. 
The Enclaves theory is chosen here to represent the ‘darker’ side of the two theories due to its centered 
position in the spectrum of this side of the debate, or in other words, it tends to lie closest to the 
consensus of what proponents of groupthink internet theories tend to advocate (Sunstein 2007).   
The results of the theory are simple, and are, in fact, what we are testing for. It is the idea that, 
due to social media’s tendency to place people together who have like minded beliefs, people will 
become more insulated in an online atmosphere where they can pick and choose who they listen to 
than if they were exposed to differing opinions on the headlines of a newspaper (hence Sunstein’s 
contrasting ‘headlines’ theory of media diversity) (Sunstein 2007). This leads, of course, to further group 
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identification, and prevents people in authoritarian regimes from generating too many new or 
threatening ideas due to the fact that they will still tend to gravitate towards what they already know or, 
in other words, whatever ideological line the ruling party has been pushing.  
The logic behind the argument, however, is not so simple, and is based on modern sociological 
research related to how people form and maintain opinions. The theory draws from pre-established 
media research on how public opinion is developed, and extrapolates to the forum of the World Wide 
Web. The primary base research behind the Enclaves theory comes from established communications 
theories of information cascades and group polarization. Though two separate theories, they work 
together to produce the base of the Enclaves theory. Both of these theories rely on confirmation bias, 
the relatively simple idea that people are more likely to accept something if it resonates with what they 
already believe to be true.  
The theory of Information Cascades speaks about how rumors are started, and how information 
is changed from something generally harmless into something generally harmful, much like in a game of 
telephone. It begins with a proposition, which is then transmitted to another person. Whether or not 
this proposition is accepted has to do with whether or not the person in question has a confirmation 
bias towards or against the proposition. If they are amenable to it, it will be passed onto another person 
in a slightly changed form. In the end, it will have grown and gained a life of its own, accepted as truth 
throughout the community of people who propagated the rumor’s existence (Sunstein 2009).  
Due to confirmation bias, the rumor is picked up, and then circulated widely until it is seen as 
having ‘credence’. The theory of group polarization describes what happens when a group of people 
who hold similar confirmation biases get together in the absence of dissenting opinions and discuss the 
opinions wherein their biases reside, and specifically in this case, the rumor. The theory states that, 
while they may have only held uncertain opinions on certain subjects before, by discussing these 
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subjects together, not only do these people become more certain that their opinions are correct, but 
they become more radicalized in their views, moving further down the spectrum in whatever direction 
they tended to tilt towards in the first place (Sunstein 2009).  
This was demonstrated at a social psychology experiment in Colorado that Sunstein references 
in his book ‘On Rumors’. In this experiment, 60 Americans were taken and sorted into groups of 5 or 6 
each. The people, unbeknownst to them, were taken from specifically liberal or conservative counties 
throughout the state. Though the guests believed there to be a diversity of opinions represented, in 
reality, the subjects had been placed together based on predisposition to specific political beliefs. They 
were then divided into groups that were asked to discuss, among other things, 1) Should the US sign an 
international climate treaty to combat climate change 2) Should affirmative action remain an institution, 
and 3) Should states allow gays and lesbians to marry or receive civil unions. Before the talk, each 
person was asked these questions, and most responses, measured on a 1-10 scale of how intensely the 
subjects felt about the propositions, qualified as moderate. After being given a mere fifteen minutes to 
discuss the positions amongst themselves, each person in each group had moved markedly towards the 
pole to which their beliefs, and the beliefs of those in their group, were already inclined. It seemed, 
then, that discussion in ideologically homogenous populations acted as a reinforcing agent of ideas, 
rather than a breeding ground for new ones (Sunstein 2009). 
These all come together to form the Enclaves of Extremism theory. It’s application in 
authoritarian states is the idea that, due to the limited discourse that is allowed and that is taking place 
online, even if people are presented with new information online, they will reject that information in 
favor of information that tends to fit with that they already know (IE, the party line), so long as other 
participants act to help reinforce their biases. Also, because online forums tend to be places where 
discussion is limited to take place only among groups of people who already somewhat agree with the 
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party line (as the others are ostensibly either censored, or else are dissuaded from posting on the forum 
due to the chilling effect that the threat of censorship entails), the internet will tend to act as an 
insulator rather than an agent of opening up, re-cementing peoples’ initial group identifications. This, in 
turn, is said to douse what cyber-optimists refer to as the ‘democratizing power of the internet’; 
because people tend to gravitate towards what they already know, and because what they already know 
is what is produced in private rooms in the party’s propaganda department, the internet will become a 
place where these propaganda pieces, while initially doubted, actually gain more validity amongst the 
people due to the discussion process on the internet.  
II) A Note on Theory Applicability and Chinese Censorship 
One common criticism leveled at studies of the internet in China, or in authoritarian countries in 
general, is that normal theories should not necessarily apply, as this simply attempts to attach a western 
paradigm to countries where the internet is, the critics assert, little more than yet another outlet for the 
relaying of central party ideas. Like the technology of Orwell’s 1984, they assert, the internet in these 
countries is merely a tool to further integrate propaganda into the home. However, the Chinese internet 
is much freer than many western observers initially expected it to be.  
To begin with, tough internet controls do exist in the PRC. It has been well documented that 
China has a very thorough system of internet surveillance, comprised of firewalls and weed out 
programs on one side that prevent access to or the production of sensitive materials, and the internet 
police on the other, who are in charge of both finding and stopping people who are considered 
‘politically disruptive’, and posting comments favorable to the party’s stance, so as to maintain a feeling 
that the Party’s viewpoint is the most popular one. As well, Chinese internet users are driven to self-
censorship through a ‘chilling effect’ brought on by ubiquitous images of the internet police’s mascots, 
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JinJin and Chacha, a cartoon pair plastered around internet chatboards to remind users that they are 
being watched (King et. Al 2012). 
 Despite this control, however, it is still clear that discussion exists independent of the Party’s 
control. In a 2012 study by a number of Harvard political scientists, it was revealed that the censorship 
habits of the party differ slightly than what was initially imagined. It was revealed that, while some 
extremely politically sensitive materials were removed on a regular basis by moderators (such as 
information pertaining to the Tiananmen Square protests), criticisms of the government were, for the 
vast majority of the time, allowed to remain untouched. Instead, what was often cleansed were posts 
calling for collective action or protests. And even then, the only instances of these being cleansed were 
if the movements were explicitly pro-democracy or heinously anti-government; most of the time, as 
long as the collective action called for contained some patriotic sentiment, it was allowed to go 
untouched (more on that later) (King et. Al 2012).   
As well, the reason that China is not only applicable here, but is also perhaps one of the most 
relevant modern countries to this study, is due to the odd degree of freedom that people have in 
discussing a certain, limited range of topics within a confined region on the internet, while at the same 
time possessing the high levels of censorship that necessarily labels it an authoritarian state (King, Pan, 
Roberts 2012). Christensen elaborates on how, in this day and age where nationalism is the primary 
party ideology, rather than communism, criticism of the government is allowed to exist as long as it 
comes from a nationalistic viewpoint. That is, you can tell the government that it is doing something 
wrong as long as your ultimate goals seem to be patriotic (Christensen 2011). In this way, it possesses 
the best of both worlds, and represents a square medium for authoritarian internet studies, giving 
enough freedom for the theories to be applicable, but enough control so that the system qualifies as 
authoritarian. One can also expect that China’s internet strategy will be followed or emulated in the 
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future by other authoritarian states wishing to take the same approach to a liberal internet, as it, in a 
world enamored with the idea of an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’, will probably serve as a model that 
others will follow. It possesses the most extensive system of internet surveillance, censorship, and 
policing in the world, and it is certainly one of the most successful (Bennett 2013). 
III) History of Chinese Civil Society 
To truly have a good understanding of the importance of the internet in China today, it is important 
to understand how Chinese civil society has developed in correlation with the development of internet 
technology over the years. Tracing the development of civil society from the late Qing dynasty, to its 
sudden truncation under Mao, and rebirth in China’s opening up, reveals an incipient civil society that 
lends itself more strongly to the social effects of online interaction 
Civil society will be herein defined using the Jurgen Kocka summation of it as “a space of self-
organization in between the state, corporate, and private sectors (Takahashi  2008). Most scholars agree 
that imperial China, in which the reigning ideology of Confucianism stressed a hierarchical, family-like 
order leading directly from the nuclear family to the Emperor himself, did not possess a traditional, 
western-defined civil society. The increasing independence of the merchant class lead to the creation, in 
trade oriented cities such as Hankow (now part of modern Wuhan) lead to the creation of trade boards 
and organizations tasked, in some areas, with the maintenance of civil order. These are alleged to be at 
least forerunners of the civil society concept (Takahashi 2008).  
Most also agree, however, that the development was completely halted under the Maoist regime 
(Yang 2003). Due to the totalitarian incorporation of all social functions into the state, civil society was, 
more or less, obliterated as a concept. The only spontaneous demonstrations or organizations came 
from the Communist affiliated mobs during the Cultural Revolution that would take it upon themselves 
to carry out the will of the party, often in a rather uncivil manner. Ideology was stifled and carefully 
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regulated under the communist regime, preventing any sort of civil society from forming (Takahashi 
2008). 
This changed, however, under the era of Deng Xiaoping. Xiaoping was known for many things, not 
least among them being the monumental opening up effort that has brought Chinese society into the 
industrialized world. But with economic openness came a slight degree of social openness, as well. It 
came with the government initially trying to distribute more power to individual organizations, such as 
companies, so that they did not have to micromanage emerging civil society. Public gatherings and 
independent organizations faced a different story, with gatherings being allowed, in theory, but 
requiring a permit, lest they be labeled ‘illegal’. The opening up drive, however, continued to import 
new technologies, and eventually brought even the internet into the PRC (Yang 2003).  
 What did continue to develop, however, was a more autonomous corporatist structure that 
began to distance itself from the party’s central control (Takahashi 2008). With the opening up efforts of 
the economy, the CCP dictated that certain government mandated corporate entities could form their 
own trade boards and organizations, so long as they maintained the strict boundaries set by the party. 
While the original intent of this was to outsource the maintenance of order and of the party line to 
organizations that could more effectively police themselves, so that the top down model could be 
reinforced by local actors, the effect was to grant corporate entities more authority in an already 
liberalizing economy.  
 Aside from this, however, civil society remained fairly nonexistent, especially for the average 
person, and especially in the politically-related sphere. Therefore, an incipient civil society existed that 
could, possibly, give way to the effects of increasing societal digitization.  
 Before speaking about the internet, however, it is necessary to discuss another factor in the 
creation of Chinese internet civil society; youth nationalism. It is important to note that, once 
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communism ceased to be China’s primary economic model, it ceased to be the primary ideological 
adhesive for the country, as well (Cao 2005). Whereas beforehand it was the communist revolution that 
brought the people together, the manifesto was now growth at any cost. Henceforth, the Chinese 
people were not to look to Marx for inspiration, but to China itself, as it took a path to development 
based on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Hence, the government stepped up the criticisms of 
China’s old enemies and a glorification of the state’s imminent rise to power to give the people an 
ideological fodder to hold onto (Cao 2005).The youth were the primary targets of this new nationalism, 
as they were both the ones inheriting the growth, and the ones who could be taught in schools that, say, 
Japanese imperialism is the primary threat to their country’s national security.  
 What this ended up creating, ironically, was a certain, small degree of free speech in China that 
hadn’t existed before. Whereas before, expressing anything even slightly outside the party line would 
have gotten one arrested, now, as the party line was more blurred, and vague ‘nationalism’ became the 
only thing demanded of a citizen, it was up to a citizen to decide to what degree they would be 
nationalistic. As well, due to the seeming unwillingness of party officials to challenge hawkish news 
reporters, which some observers link to a desire to maintain a façade of cohesion on foreign policy 
issues, it has become a relatively safe and common practice for news officials to criticize the 
government from a nationalistic standpoint. Because the CCP couldn’t recant their own ideology by 
arresting someone who was being a proper nationalist, people found that they could criticize the 
government. This meant that youth were free to discuss their own opinions of the government as long 
as their opinions fell within a certain ideological spectrum (Christensen 2011).  
 A primary example of this phenomenon is the emergence of a class of Chinese youth nationalists 
known as the Fenqing, literally meaning the ‘Angry Young Men’. Originally coined in the late 1970s to 
refer to leftist Chinese youth who supported reform in the country, and who generally held Maoist 
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views, it is now used to refer to any youth individual who engages in politics from a nationalistic point of 
view, especially in the online world (Hughes 2009). Fenqing have become famous, or infamous, in China 
for their rhetorical attacks on Chinese leaders who are considered too ‘soft’ on foreign policy issues, and 
for their attempts to quell any opinions, within or outside of mainland China, that contradict their 
fervent passion for nationalistic revival. In one particular incident, Fenqing operating within mainland 
China actually succeeded in stealing and publishing online the personal information of a Chinese girl 
studying at Duke University. The girl had attempted to mitigate discussion on campus between pro-Tibet 
independence protestors and local Chinese student expatriates who were staging a counter protest, and 
this was seen as ideological treason by the Fenqing. They labeled her a traitor, and attempted to smear 
her image and defame her by releasing her information to the public online, including personal financial 
statements (Dewan 2008). While the aggressive method of private information publishing has not been 
pursued in the direction of government officials, the Fenqing have not been quiet online in their 
criticisms of these officials’ positions. 
 Due to China’s desire to modernize and attract both investment and internet entrepreneurship, 
the blogosphere in China was allowed to develop, though in a stunted version of its foreign 
counterparts. Many US sites containing sensitive information about things such as the Tiananmen 
Square Protests were censored, but in some places chat rooms operated with sufficient impunity that 
people could discuss mostly whatever they wanted to, so long as it wasn’t too inflammatory. Chinese 
social media is generally very fragmented (King et. Al 2012), though a few ‘super large’ chat forums exist 
for discussions of an explicitly political nature, among them the “Strong Nation Forum” (Qiangguo 
Luntan) of the People’s Daily that I will heavily explore (Liu 2008). While these  were generally heavily 
monitored and preapproved by the Chinese government, smaller sites tend to be  often used by 
netizens experienced in the art of deception to carry on conversations in code, or used to get around the 
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firewall, so that they could exchange information the way that one would in a non-censored internet 
(Wang 2012).  
 China did everything it could to maintain internet decorum, building what some experts refer to 
as a ‘panopticon’ of surveillance. Though most people who posted sensitive content were never 
arrested, the few that were used as examples to create a chilling effect and prevent further internet 
deviance. As well, thousands of ‘internet police’ were hired to not only delete comments about 
politically sensitive materials, but to post comments supporting the party on the websites (Watts 2005).  
 What is interesting, however, is the fact that this has done little to deter criticisms of the party 
online. The Chinese people, having taken the internet over as a replacement for physical civil society, 
have become seemingly more attached to internet discussion than some western countries have, and 
the CCP seems hesitant to step on this. As well, most criticisms of the party online seem to fall within 
that spectrum of ‘too patriotic to censor’ that was discussed before. Online, however, there are plenty 
of comments that are not particularly patriotic that will go uncensored (though many still are), due in 
part to the fact that the Chinese are defensive of their (limited) internet freedom (King et. Al 2012).  
 Now that we have painted a picture of the functioning of the internet in modern day China, we 
can begin with the evidence.  
IV) Evidence Examined 
Due to the pro-nationalist freedom that exists in the media sphere in China today, it would make 
sense that most of the popular variation in expression and opinion we will find will be contained within 
thought centered on foreign policy issues. As well, lacking any sort of large scale popular opinion polls 
with the reliability of, say, an American Gallup organization, or something of that sort, the primary 
evidence here examined will be things that are, prima facie, indicative of mass opinion. Such evidence 
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will include protests, online movements, and large scale online discussions related to foreign policy, 
though I have included an example of public opinion concerning censorship, as well. These things will be 
examined first to make certain that they are truly grassroots movements in themselves, and that they 
do not seem to emerge from party-sponsored activities. The evidence examined will include the 2005 
anti-Japanese protests, the 2008 foreign boycotts, the 2012 Senkaku protests, and the use of a popular 
internet meme in China to avoid censorship filters. Conclusions are then drawn based on how these 
instances represent microcosms of the theories at work.  
A) 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests 
The anti-Japanese protests of 2005 represent some of the largest public demonstrations in China in 
the past ten years, and their scope and intensity amongst large, political demonstrations by the Chinese 
people was only recently surpassed by the larger 2012 Senkaku protests which, like the aforementioned 
protests, were fueled by online activism. The nature of how these protests were constructed reveals 
how internet discussion actually increased rumors and jingoism among online activists, and these 
rumors, in turn, fueled the protests to the size that they became. The fervor, which was matched by 
parallel protests in a number of other countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Liu 
2008), brought people out to the streets to protest what were seen as indignities committed by the 
Japanese. 
The protests expressed opposition primarily to Japan’s supposed justification of its colonial legacy in 
a newly released series of history textbooks, and to its bid for permanent membership status into the 
UN Security Council (Liu 2008). As they gained steam, other issues surfaced, as well, such as oil drilling 
rights in the East China Sea, the testing of chemical weapons on civilians during WWII, and the ongoing 
territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (more on that later). The protests were not contained to 
China, and in fact spread, most notably, to the South Korean capital of Seoul, as well as to Taiwan and 
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the Philippines, though in smaller numbers. The initial government reactions were strongest from China 
and South Korea, which both issued unilateral condemnations of Japan, and demands that the textbooks 
be withdrawn from the market, and that Japan not be given a seat on the UN Security Council (Liu 2008).  
Though the protests themselves did not originate online, cyberspace was used prominently by 
activists in many cities to organize further and to debate the nature of the protests, especially where the 
protests met either resistance or nonchalance by the Chinese authorities, and to organize specific 
protest related activities, such as boycotts of Japanese goods (Liu 2008). The use of the online realm to 
promote these interests independent of the government’s own initiative, and specifically to promote 
activities that the CCP either discouraged or suppressed, suggests a change in relationship between the 
government and the people in the minds of the demonstrators.  
The protests initially emerged as a reaction to the release of the new Japanese history textbook by 
the Japanese Society for Textbook Reform in late March of 2005. The book, known in Japan as Atarashii 
Rekishi Kyōkasho (simply ‘New History Textbook) was picked up by the Chinese media, who had already 
covered previous Japanese textbook controversies in 2000, and by internet activists in Hong Kong who 
had done the same (Liu 2008). The immediate note was outrage; sections of the book began circulating 
online and were covered extensively in the Chinese news media, which alleged that these sections not 
only downplayed Japanese atrocities during WWII, but whitewashed them entirely. In particular, a 
passage relating to the Nanking Massacre was widely circulated, saying: 
“At this time, many Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded by Japanese troops. 
Documentary evidence has raised doubts about the actual number of victims claimed by the incident. 
The debate continues even today (JSHTR 2005).” 
This was all that was mentioned of the Nanking Massacre in the book, and the first responders on 
the Chinese side asserted that this intentionally downplayed the issue to Japanese students. They used 
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this, in conjunction with things such as high-profile Japanese statesmen’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (a 
shrine that honors, among others, a number of war criminals) as evidence that the Japanese had not 
completely renounced their colonial legacy. Initial protests broke out in Guangzhou, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, all three of which used the “Strong Nation” forum (Qiangguo Luntan, or QL for short), an 
online subsidiary of the People’s Daily magazine, to coordinate. Before continuing, it is worth noting that 
QL is an online message board that embodies the strange limbo of Chinese internet policy in that, 
though it is in fact an organ of the Chinese Communist Party (in this case, the widely circulated China 
Daily newspaper), it is renown to have some of the most lenient moderators of any popular forum in 
China, with the most negative comments getting deleted, but most other things, even things that are 
blatantly critical of the CCP, remaining untouched (Liu 2008). 
Evidence for both the grassroots nature of these protests and for the workings of the Enclaves 
theory, specifically, at work can be found in the way the protests began (Liu 2008). When CCTV initially 
picked up the story about the New History Textbook, small protests had already broken out, most 
notably in Shenzhen, but the news network, for the most part, ignored them in their coverage of the 
event (Liu 2008). What CCTV did cover was in a mostly matter-of-fact tone, expressing disapproval of the 
bid, but neither were there calls for outright protest or even a strong condemnation. The lack of news 
coverage became a topic of dispute on the website, with many participants questioning why the 
protests were ignored. The majority concluded that the government was ignoring the protests to keep 
with its message of a ‘harmonious society’, while ignoring the public. One comment on the forum even 
went so far as to assert that Xinhua was “intentionally deceiving the Chinese people” (Liu 2008).  
In some isolated cases, protestors then went out of their ways to get the attention of the media, 
with some calling publically for the protests to be covered. (Liu 2008) The government reacted, 
however, by attempting to quell the protests further, while allowing enough to produce convenient 
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coverage. In many cases, out of fear of the protests growing too large and unwieldy, the CCP attempted 
to either downplay the importance of the protests, to cut off public transportation close to the protest 
site (as opposed to helping certain groups of protestors, as they did in Beijing), to issue official 
statements urging calm, or all three (Liu 2008). When the People’s Daily ran an article entitled 
“Sustaining Stability Through the Construction of a Harmonious Society” on April 17, however, the 
reaction was to change the frame of discussion amongst the protestors for the next three days from 
how to get noticed to what the government was doing wrong 
On April 18 and 19, QL was inundated with posts criticizing the government’s allegedly lackadaisical 
treatment of the issue, declaring that the CCP was too immersed in its treatment of a harmonious 
society to make any serious action. What is interesting to note, however, is the fact that the severity of 
the reaction changed over time. Initially, posts voiced critical opinion of the CCP’s lack of interest, but 
after a day, a series of posts accusing the government of complicity in the issue became popular, and an 
ongoing theory that, according to Liu, the government was “orchestrating the message for Japan’s UN 
bid” was occurring. One post noted that the protestors should be wary of, 
“Be watchful of the collusion that takes the construction of harmonious society as an excuse but 
surrenders and betrays the national interest! (Liu 2008)”  
Comments that did not reflect this particular theory instead followed a much more frenzied line 
than they did a few days ago, with posts appearing increasingly comparing Japan’s bid to its imperialistic 
expansion in the years before WWII. One post, in particular, stated that 
“Should a ‘harmonious’ society that is being assaulted and bullied still be called ‘harmonious? 
Foreign antagonistic forces would never give up their ambition … they would never allow you to develop 
yourself peacefully and stably. This is a just self-deceiving slogan fooling ordinary people!” (Liu 2008) 
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 What this lead to was a list of grievances, mostly consisting of things that the Chinese protestors 
considered either uncovered or only partially covered by the Chinese media, that was circulated around 
the message board. Among these things were an uncovered Japanese congressman’s visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, a site dedicated to soldiers and commanders who fell in service to Japan in WWII (and, 
according to Chinese activists, a large number of war criminals), the lack of coverage of the protests in 
Shenzhen, and the overall tone of the Chinese media towards recent events concerning Japan. To 
compensate, a large number of comments appeared on the website asking for people to gather in open 
spaces and protest the atrocities of Japan (Yardley 2005). 
In addition, as the attitude had changed to lean towards a feeling that the protestor must be self 
sufficient from government help, posters on QL began attempting to organize protests against Japanese 
goods (which would later serve as a model for the 2008 Japanese boycotts, to be discussed later in the 
paper). While the campaigns were stifled due to disagreement among the protestors, they are worth 
noting simply due to the autonomy of the protestors from the organization of the CCP itself, and their 
use of technology to organize spontaneously (Yardley 2005).  
The boycott situation is also of note for the underlying feeling that, ultimately, funding Japanese 
companies is dangerous due to perceived Japanese militarism. First, it is worth noting that, even though 
Japan does possess a formidable, modern defense force, its military expenditure, even in 2005, was 
dwarfed by that of China, and there was no visible buildup of Japanese military might at the time. As 
well, the Japanese constitution espouses a policy of pacifism, and it is common knowledge that, since 
WWII, the country has, legally speaking, relinquished the technical right to wage war. This suggests that 
the threat, in whatever dimension it was states, was perceived, rather than real, suggesting, again, that 
the primary impetus for the protests was information that was used from CCP propaganda regarding the 
historic belligerency of Japan.  
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The attempt to organize a boycott online was, in particular, indicative of Enclaves theory at work. Liu 
demonstrates that, at the beginning of the boycott discussions (around mid April), opinions amongst the 
protestors were actually divided into multiple groups. Some saw the boycotts as a short term strategy, 
others as a longer endeavor. Many stated that the boycotts, if they were even carried out, should be 
directed only against Japanese companies owned by “radical right wing revisionists” so as not to punish 
the “virtuous Japanese people (Liu 152). Many even stated that the boycott should be seen as an initial 
punishment, but should then be followed by gestures to “improve Sino-Japanese friendship”. Many 
argued that the boycotts simply should not take place at all.  
However, the eventual confluence of comments drowned out the initial voices of the 
moderates, and eventually the majority of the posts were seen as supporting the boycott position. Liu 
documents, as well, that, upon discussion with the newly arriving participants, many old participants 
shifted to support the boycott, claiming that it was, in the end, the ‘patriotic’ thing to do (Liu 2008). This 
seems to suggest a version of events where discussion in a radicalized atmosphere eventually created a 
consensus.  
Overall, therefore, due to the divergence form initial CCP goals and influence, the protests can be 
seen as truly grassroots movements, rather than top down political implementations, as suggested by 
some western observers. But does the way that the protests were conceived have anything to say about 
the aforementioned media theories?  
At a first glance, the content of the theories, and the fact that they cast the relationship between 
the government and people as one of dialogue rather than one of support, seems to support the line of 
the ‘Google Doctrine’ theories.  
However, at a second glance, the discussions in existence on QL seem to be indicative of the 
processes that are said to contribute to Enclave Extremism. What is interesting here is that, for the most 
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part, the discussion of activists on the Strong Nation forum tends to lean distinctly to the right foreign-
policy wise in relationship to the Chinese Communist Party itself. None of them particularly disagree 
with the CCP’s stance that Japan is a dangerous colonial power that has yet to renounce its history or its 
aggression, but as they discuss these instances online, they tend to express views as seen above. In the 
above quote, the phrase ‘foreign antagonistic forces’ refers here to Japan, and the sentiment expressed 
seems to be that the situation is much more severe and dire than the Communist Party has predicted, or 
is acting towards. Instead, it is alleged that the country is actually in more danger than the party initially 
expressed. Therefore, the protests are, to some extent, a reflection of a conviction that, if things are to 
get done, the Chinese netizens have to take things into their own hands. This is interesting again 
because it represents both a criticism and a support of the Party’s policies at the same time, and it 
suggests that a radicalization of opinion has taken place, a la the Colorado Experiment.  
So where does this event fit in with the theory? It seemed to follow a pattern of 1) the 
information was processed and absorbed by internet residents, as presented on CCTV 2) the information 
was then discussed online, and disagreements were found with certain aspects of the CCP, and then 
protests were fomented outside of cyberspace. What is interesting is that this phenomenon fits with 
aspects of both of the aforementioned theories. First of all, it seems to fit the pattern of the enclaves of 
extremism theory in that, when the policy was discussed online amidst people who, at least nominally, 
considered themselves to be Chinese nationalists, the initial position (that of the CCP) was taken, and 
then was further radicalized in the end by the protestors. One could argue, however, that the actions of 
the protestors also follow the Google Doctrine prediction that a civil society dissatisfied with its current 
political situation would use the internet to further its political goals, changing the relationship between 
it and the government. Even if this is the case, however, consensus seemed to be an idea born of the 
enclave processes, albeit one that the people took into their own hands.  
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B)  2008-2009 Anti-Foreign Boycotts/Protests 
Another instance to consider is the anti foreign boycotts that were organized by Chinese netizens 
during the Olympics, and specifically those directed towards France, the United States, and Japan. These 
boycotts are important because, not only do they suggest, in their divergence from the CCP’s more 
level-headed diplomacy, that the protestors implicitly disapprove of their party’s handling of events, but 
they actually represent one of the first times that the Chinese public has spontaneously organized via 
the internet to take concrete action against a perceived grievance without direction from the party itself 
(Li 2009). Their origin, due to the similarity of aims and discussion, seems to come from the initial 
boycott discussions during the aforementioned 2005 protests. And like these protests, the 2008 
boycotts began, but where else, on the internet. In the end, they also seem to be driven by hyper-
aggrandized rumors, even when most evidence points to the fact that these rumors are false. 
The most important boycotts to observe here, due to their size and success, are those against 
France. While protests directed towards the United States and the UK during the games focused on 
things such as the preferential treatment of the Dali Lama and the US media coverage of the Chinese, 
the protests towards the French were unique in that they organized a large business boycott that 
enlisted government aid (Li 2009). These protests, unlike the others, did not contain overt criticisms of 
the government, but instead directed the attention of the boycotts entirely outwards.  
The protests began when the running of the torch by Paralympics athlete Jin Jing was disrupted in 
Paris by pro-Tibet protestors. The event was first documented and reported by China Central Television 
and, like the other events, was then taken into discussion on the internet (Li 2009). The discussion 
period from the time the torch was disrupted to the actual protests took about 28 days, with the torch 
being run on April 7 and the first protests appearing in front of French supermarket chain Carrefour 
around April 28 (Pal 2009). During this time, the process of information cascades and ‘enclaves’ was 
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once again demonstrated. In calling for boycotts of French goods, and specifically of Carrefour, a popular 
(but false) rumor was circulated that the chain had donated large sums of money to the Dalai Lama, 
according to Minsheng (Li 2009). As well, it was widely circulated on the ‘Strong Nation Forum’ that the 
protestors were not actually demonstrators, but people hired by the French government to disrupt the 
protests.  This is crucial because the very locus of the protests themselves were to hit back at French 
companies that were considered ‘anti-Chinese’, echoing the sentiment of some 2005 protestors that 
only the ‘virtuous’ Japanese should be left alone. Yet, the reason that Carrefour was targeted out of all 
French companies, aside from its ubiquity in various Chinese cities, was this rumor which, before the 
boycott discussions on QL, had not existed at all (Pal 2009). Despite the lack of evidence for this 
assertion, belief was strong enough in it to spark a protest, suggesting that cascading effects were at 
work. Hence, the activists called for an economic boycott to punish France. 
In addition to their boycott against Carrefour, the activists called on people to protest visits to 
France in the future. In the two months following the torch incident, Chinese visits to France dropped by 
70%, according to Herve Ladsous, the French ambassador to Beijing. This was effective enough that the 
Parisian city government sent correspondence to Beijing, urging the government to quell the unofficial 
boycott on travel (Li 2009).  
Like the 2005 protests, the protests against France seem to offer an awkward amalgamation of the 
two theories. On one hand, as stated above, a major impetus for the boycotts was the rumor born 
online through enclaves of Carrefour’s complicity with the Dalai Lama. On the other hand, the actions of 
the protestors show a very marked shift in the way they viewed their relationship with the government. 
When the picketing began in front of Carrefour chains on April 1, the netizens contacted the Chinese 
government, urging it to cancel the 21 business contracts (adding up to over $1 billion) it made with 
France in 2007, and expected the government to stand behind their protests. While they declined, the 
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CCP did stand with the boycotts against French travel, firing back to Mr. Ladsous, when he urged them 
to quell the boycotts, that the Chinese netizens had the right to make their own choices, and that they 
stood behind them, as France needed to learn that diplomacy was a “two way street” (Li 2009). This 
suggests that the protestors view, and have their views reinforced by government support, that they 
have at least some freedom in the way they express their nationalism, and that they can view the 
government as a tool to support them, rather than themselves as tools to support their government, 
echoing the civil society change that Google Doctrine theories predict. Ultimately, however, their actions 
are driven by the rumor produced by online enclave processes, suggesting that between the two 
theories, this one had a more pronounced effect on their execution.  
One of the more conservative instances of protest in China, however, centered on an online 
campaign designed to increase national morale in the light of what was seen as a series of insults to 
Chinese national pride by CNN. Beginning in early 2008, a series of anti-Chinese riots broke out in Tibet, 
many of which called for independence and/or a loosening of government policy towards Tibet. The 
riots, which spread from Lhasa to the rest of the region, targeted ethnic Han Chinese and their property, 
and were deemed by onlookers to be very disorganized and violent, rather than concerted and goal 
oriented (CNN 2008). In its coverage of the event, however, CNN released a number of photographs that 
Chinese netizens deemed ‘altered’, due to their depictions of the protestors as peaceful and of the 
Chinese police as brutal (Li 2009). This incited a rage that lead to both protests around the network, and 
an online ‘national pride’ campaign designed to act as a countermeasure to perceived anti-Chinese 
sentiments expressed by CNN’s staff. The value of these protests for theory, however, lies mostly in how 
Chinese social media seems to have created a sort of ‘rally around the flag’ effect, taking statements 
that were originally released by Communist Party officials and running with them to their logical 
extremes. 
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The discovery that CNN had cropped a number of photos related to the protests sparked online 
discussions where the images, which were alleged to be intentionally doctored to advance an anti-
Chinese bias, became symbols of what the netizens felt was an inherent Sinophobia in western media (Li 
2009). The discussion began with Chinese nationals in western countries posting images from CNN onto 
message boards in China, and comparing them with similar ones released on Chinese news channels, 
such as Xinhua.cn, China’s state-run news website. The primary focus was on how the photos seemed to 
lessen image of the violence of the Tibetan protestors, and to indict the Chinese police in apparent 
brutality against the peaceful Tibetans. One popular image included a Chinese man raising his arm to 
defend himself from a blow initiated by a Tibetan protestor. The image was cropped so that twelve 
other weapon-wielding Tibetans in the background were left out (Li 2009). CNN claimed that this 
cropping was done so that the image could meet the required frame size for the image, but Chinese 
netizens alleged that the cropping was meant to lessen the malicious depiction of the Tibetans (CNN 
2009). More credibility was given to the netizens’ claims when two images surfaced that claimed to 
depict Tibetan protestors being attacked by the Chinese police. It was demonstrated, however, that in 
both cases the police were not actually Chinese; the first incident depicted Nepalese police in 
Kathmandu, a city neighboring Tibet, clashing with protestors, while the second depicted a similar clash 
with Indian police. These photos were also circulated around, among others, Fox News, The Washington 
Post, and the BBC (Li 2009). 
Adding to the fire, the straw that broke the camel’s back came when CNN correspondent Jack 
Cafferty referred to the Chinese police and government as “goons and thugs” on the Situation Room 
when discussing China’s treatment of the pro-Tibet protestors. The message was relayed to the Chinese 
public by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, when it released a press statement stating that 
29 
 
“We are shocked by and strongly condemn the malicious attacks on the Chinese people by CNN’s 
Cafferty. We demand CNN and Cafferty himself take back his vile remarks and apologize to all the 
Chinese people (Li 2009).” 
The ministry depicted the discussion as an insult to all Chinese people, rather than just the people 
involved in the suppression of the Tibetan protests. This was immediately picked up by the internet 
protestors and calls for protests and the resignation of Cafferty were made. On April 20, approximately a 
thousand Chinese protestors (mostly expatriates) gathered outside of CNN’s Hollywood headquarters to 
protest the photos and comments and to demand the resignation of Cafferty (Li 2009).  
More interesting, however, was the reaction. Aside from the physical protests that began outside of 
CNN, an online campaign began and lasted for weeks, where approximately 5 million Chinese internet 
users on social networking sites would change their names with an addendum of “<3 China”, meaning ‘I 
‘heart’ China’. This campaign was meant to demonstrate solidarity amongst the Chinese in the face of 
what was considered a national insult by western media. To further demonstrate the popular clout that 
this incident held, a popular rap song was released online entitled ‘Don’t Be Too CNN’. The phrase was 
meant as a euphemism for ‘don’t be too closed minded’ or ‘don’t be too racist’. The video went viral in 
China, topping Baidu as one of the most searched terms in a week(Li 2009).  
While the protests outside of CNN may have been reflective of Chinese activists taking action into 
their own hands, the viral video and ‘I <3 China’ campaign symbolize an act of reaffirmation and support 
of government policy by the people of China, in an act that was fed by information born in echo 
chambers online. The Chinese online sphere cemented very early on that the photographs were 
heinously and maliciously cropped. This suggests the working of confirmation bias. As well, the vast 
majority of the Chinese netizens who changed their online avatars to support the ‘I <3 China’ movement 
were not initially part of the discussion, or any discussion, on the photo cropping. Instead, their 
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participation in the event seems to be part of an information cascade in which, due to the perceived 
support the movement had, they processed the allegations of anti-Chinese bias as true.  
In addition, while smaller in nature than the protests against the US/CNN coverage of the Tibetan 
riots and those against French activism at the Olympic Torch Relay, the protests against a British 
university’s decision to award an honorary doctorate to the Dalai Lama reveal the potency of the 
Chinese nationalistic echo chamber.  
On May 21 of 2008, when China was still dealing with the results of a large and devastating 
earthquake in Sichuan Provence, the London Metropolitan University decided to award the Dalai Lama 
an honorary doctorate in philosophy, a decision which proved, at least to Chinese netizens, to be of 
particularly poor timing (Xiang 2008). Discussion began with students going online and condemning the 
Dalai Lama and expressing hurt at the university’s perceived injustice. One commenter even stated that 
the award was a “Rape of the Chinese people’s feelings (Li 2009).” Another stated that the doctorate 
was tantamount to a declaration of war against the Chinese people (Li 2009). The day after, petitions 
were circulated online that attempted to 1) get the university to revoke the doctorate that it had 
granted the Dalai Lama, and 2) to create a large boycott of British Universities unless an apology was 
made and the action itself was revoked. The latter was created on the basis that China is the largest 
exporter of students in the world, and that a student boycott would effectively hurt the pockets of 
British universities seeking foreign student to fill their ranks (Li 2009). 
 The petition was circulated both online and around a number of government agencies, which 
agreed to pick up the petitions at the activists’ requests. Approximately 2,500 netizens signed the 
petition, with 95% of those agreeing to the proposed conditions and to the boycott. As well, of the 20 
international education consultancies in Beijing, 17 signed onto the petition, stating that they would 
agree to inhibit students from enrolling in British universities unless the proposed conditions were met. 
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The petition seemed to be effective. On June 16, the Metropolitan University of London wrote a letter to 
the Chinese Embassy expressing an apology for having awarded the Dalai Lama the doctorate, and, 
while it didn’t repeal the decision to grant the doctorate, it did promise that it would never happen 
again (Li 2009).  
While the instant itself definitely depicts what could be called a change of characterized 
relationships between the government and the people, whether or not it fits into the liberal or enclaves 
theory is another question. There is no question that it represents the growing power of the position of 
Chinese activism; without any support or urging from the government, these people acted as foreign 
policy instruments that castigated a foreign university for a diplomatic slight it had made. However, it 
simultaneously shows a scenario in which netizens organized without any prior prompting using the 
internet, and yet the actions that they took were markedly conservative. In getting the party on board 
via the participation of the 17 foreign study institutions, they made it into what could be called an 
‘official’ movement against the London Metropolitan University. Their willingness to participate directly 
with the government suggests that they see themselves as instruments of the will of the state of China, 
rather than part of a struggle incited by an independent segment of civil society.  
All three 2008 instances instances where hyper-nationalist sentiments created an echo chamber in 
which confirmation bias seemed to flourish, despite the openness of the internet. Even in things such as 
photographs, which should be open to different interpretation based on one’s ability to see it for 
him/herself, the pattern of a reinforcement and radicalization of opinions along a conservative line was 
followed. However, the reactions of the Chinese netizens seemed to suggest that they feel entitled to 
demand that the government do something different about these grievances than they already are. This 
suggests that, in some way, civil society may be actually contributing to the enclaves discussion, rather 
than to the more liberal discussions as predicted in the ‘Google Doctrine’ theories.  
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One thing that must be taken into consideration is the technological limitations that exist on the 
ability of the CCP to censor the works of online activists, as this modifies the theories we are working 
with; while the ‘Enclaves’ theory has much more ground to stand on when the vast majority of what 
internet users will be exposed to is, in fact, one homogenous opinion repeated ad nauseum, only in 
different guises, if internet users could still find a way to discuss more colorful opinions, even if in muted 
form, then the prospect for the Google Doctrine could still have some life in it. And this is exactly what 
the story of the Grass-Mud Horse and its struggle against the River Crab represents. 
C)  Chinese Internet Memes and Covert Online Protest 
In early 2009, Chinese internet forums, including high traffic ones such as the previously discussed 
‘Strong Nation Forum’, began to see seemingly random and impertinent discussions about a struggle 
between a mythical creature known as a Grass-Mud Horse (pronounced ‘Cao-Ni-Ma’ 草泥马) and the evil 
River Crab that was invading its homeland, the MaLe Desert, pop up randomly in discussions that tended 
to cover relatively serious topics, including those of a political persuasion. As well, the creatures, which 
resembled alpacas, appeared in internet memes, plushies, and even a popular Baidu (Chinese 
Google/entertainment aggregator) children’s video where the alpaca-like creatures happily sing about 
their triumph over struggle (chinadigitaltimes 2012). If internet viewers happened to observe that the 
Chinese characters for the creature happened to look and sound suspiciously like a very vulgar slur 
against someone’s mother, and that the characters for ‘River Crab’ were the inverted characters for 
‘Harmonize’, they would be correct. 
These two phrases, Mud-Grass Horse and River Crab, are examples of euphemisms used by Chinese 
netizens to protest internet censorship by the CCP. Originally, protest against the deletion of comments, 
especially popular ones on large chatboards, was conducted in the form of the creation of discussion 
threads lampooning the ‘harmonizing’ of the comments under China’s newly-inaugurated anti-
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pornography laws, which served as a front to help clean up what was considered to be an online 
environment replete with Xiaoping’s legendary intellectual flies. The term ‘Harmonized’ was an 
understated jab at then-president Hu Jintao’s proposition that such laws were created with the 
intention of ushering in a more ‘Harmonious Society’, the slogan for his years in office. Eventually, due 
to the perceived anti-government sentiments these euphemisms carried, anything including the phrase 
‘harmonized’ was added to the censorship filters on China’s websites, preventing such protests from 
being outwardly conducted (Wang 2012). 
To circumvent this, however, the internet community resorted to the production of euphemisms 
within euphemisms. The characters for ‘harmonized’ were inverted to create ‘river crab’, a symbol 
which has become synonymous with CCP internet censorship. To protest the alleged ‘clean, well-
intentioned nature’ of the pornography laws which lead to the legitimization of increased amounts of 
censorship, the ‘mud-grass horse’ was chosen as the opponent of the crab. The horse’s name is 
intentionally close to a vulgar slur against one’s mother in order to represent how freedom of 
expression, even if vulgar, will ultimately triumph over the suppression of free speech (Wang 2012).  
The importance of the pure existence of this movement is difficult to overstate. Internet censorship, 
as it does not fall within the nationalism spectrum of government criticism discussed earlier, is not a 
topic that is acceptable to discuss online, and due to its recent and especially controversial nature, open 
discussion of its existence is even more chilled, unless that discussion is in favor of its existence. Chinese 
banzhou (forum masters) have made very concerted efforts, as well, to conduct a good PR campaign for 
the existence of the Chinese pornography laws; the Public Security Bureau has even gone so far as to 
create two cartoon mascots, Jingjing and Chacha, for internet censorship, to take away the ‘Orwellian 
edge’ associated with the internet censorship laws (though the existence of the mascots also serves a 
second function as constant reminders that internet surveillance exists, and that users should be sure to 
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censor their own comments) (Yan 2006). Therefore, due to the way that the internet censorship laws 
were conveyed and discussed by the mainstream media, under the ‘Enclaves’ theory, the internet 
pornography laws should not be terribly controversial, or else, if they are, then organized protest against 
them should not emerge, due to the drowning out effect caused by a combination of the censoring of 
comments and the inundation of public forums with comments created by the Banzhou.  
However, not only does this euphemistic protest exist, but it is actually very widespread and 
popular. In 2009, it was one of the top 5 searched phrases on Baidu, China’s answer to Google. When 
the famous ‘children’s video’ was first released, it scored 1.4 million hits in its first three months online 
(Wines 2009). It has become popular enough that it has actually spawned a large series of animal 
plushies in China meant to resemble the legendary creature, and the sales surrounding the Grass-Mud 
Horse are estimated to make it a million-dollar industry (Wang 2012). The use of the euphemism has 
even made it up to the higher echelons of Chinese civil disobedience. In an image which may have 
contributed to his arrest, famed Chinese artist and dissident Ai Wei Wei posed naked for a photo, in mid 
jump, covering his genitals with only a Grass-Mud Horse plushie. The picture, entitled “Mud Horse 
Central Stop” (草泥马挡中央), can be interpreted as a vulgar slur towards the Chinese Communist Party’s 
Central Committee (Sheridan 2011). Though censorship has emerged with greater strength against the 
use of the Grass-Mud horse as a symbol of free expression, its popularity has been so enduring that, 
instead of switching to another symbol or euphemism, netizens have found other ways of constructing 
images or phrases representing the Grass-Mud Horse in forums, including drawing its silhouette with 
words on chat forums. In a 2009 iteration, the horse was depicted as a silhouette encased in smoke, 
used by some to celebrate the burning of the new CCTV building in Beijing (Wang 2012).  
Therefore, what one can conclude form this is that the ‘Enclaves Theory’, while it may be quite 
active in some respects, especially in regards to shaping citizens’ opinions and actions on foreign policy 
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issues, is not air-tight. Discourse that is contrary to the primary CCP line in a non-nationalism subject has 
found a way to exist despite censorship, and even in a forum where most of the outward, allowed 
discourse centers around pro-CCP ideologies in relation to pornography laws, the dominant voice in the 
discourse seems to be that of dissent towards the draconian mechanisms of Chinese internet 
surveillance. This suggests that the internet, according to the ‘Google Doctrine’ related theories, does 
remain a tableau where, even under censorship, dissenting opinions can coalesce and play out. 
It is worth noting, however, that the dissenting opinions are limited to whether or not the ability to 
dissent should exist or not, rather than specific foreign policy or governmental issues that have gained 
traction amongst dissidents. While the concept of internet surveillance is very easy to turn into a meme 
and lampoon via videos and coded language, more complex ideas, such as foreign policy and economics, 
may not fare so well in such an environment. And these are the areas in which the CCP still seems to 
have a monopoly on discourse, and where ‘Enclaves’ related group polarization seems to be the 
strongest, as demonstrated by the large scale public reactions against Japan and against countries that 
have been perceived to slight China. As well, this caveat does not necessarily punch a large hole in the 
‘Enclaves’ theory, as its very existence may in fact be explained by the underlying assumptions behind 
‘Enclaves’.  
The definition of ‘meme’ itself, according to its original use by evolutionary biologist Richard 
Dawkins, is “an idea, behavior, or style that spreads rapidly from person to person within a culture.” In 
his book, “The Selfish Gene”, Dawkins asserts that the process of meme generation is exponential, 
passing from person to person much like a virus would, and that its strength is based on whether or not 
a majority choose to pick it up and, due to its exponential growth, transmit it to the rest of the 
population (Dawkins 2008). Indeed, the primary transmission mechanism for knowledge of the Grass-
Mud Horse was not an organized, concerted effort for people to defy the CCP’s internet regulations, but 
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rather by means of funny images, videos and other things that were passed around much like popular 
jokes on the internet are passed around in American online culture. This theory of meme generation is 
very similar to the ‘Enclaves’ theory in that it asserts that transmission and popularization are based on 
a reinforcing of majority opinion, and that, therefore, Grass-Mud Horse could actually be an instance of 
‘Enclaves’ causality rather than of ‘Google Doctrine’ causality. Even so, however, this still leaves the 
caveat of the fact that the CCP’s voice, however prominent it is in legacy media, has been drowned out 
by a process which, theoretically, should have reinforced it a thousand times over. For this reason, 
Grass-Mud Horse seems to be an instance of ‘Enclaves’ actually reinforcing ‘Google Doctrine’ rather than 
opposing it.  
D)  2012 Senkaku Islands Protests 
The Senkaku Islands protests of 2012 are some of the largest public protest actions taken by the 
Chinese public in the last twenty years, and they seem to support aspects of both theories because, 
despite supporting a party line that has been pushed for years, they contained an important aspect of 
spontaneity and were, in a roundabout way, critical of the party. The protests followed a very close 
pattern to the protests of 2005. The most interesting thing here is that, unlike the formerly discussed 
protests, the CCP had a much stronger hand in forming these demonstrations, as the initial complaint 
about the actions of the party and the Japanese were actually premiered on CCTV, rather than on the 
internet itself, and attempted to guide the protests in many instances (BBC 2012). As if to purposefully 
demonstrate its ability to be independent, however, the Chinese blogosphere took this incentive and 
ran, forming protests which were ultimately, perhaps, even more critical of the CCP than their 2005 
counterparts. What is interesting to note, and this demonstrates exactly how beyond the CCP’s original 
intentions and control the protests got, is the lengths to which some of the protestors went. One group, 
which organized itself online, actually got a flotilla and attempted to land on the Senkaku islands to 
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plant a Chinese flag, before they were intercepted by the Japanese coast guard. Yet another group of 
protestors smashed cars and businesses owned or made by the Japanese (Martina, Jones 2012). 
 As a bit of background, the Senkaku Islands are a group of uninhabited islands possessed by 
Japan, but claimed by China, due to the historic maritime boundaries of the Qing Empire. After the 
treaty of San Francisco was signed to end the Pacific Theater of WWII, China used the clause about 
Japan returning ‘all occupied territories to their rightful owners’ to claim the Senkaku (which they refer 
to as the Diaoyu islands). It is quite possible that they desire the islands due to their fossil fuel resources 
and their very desirable location in the middle of major trade routes (Shaw 1999). The Chinese 
government has frequently used this dispute to rally public opinion against Japan, a country that is 
already demonized due to its actions in WWII. This is most likely to draw attention away from domestic 
disputes. Hence, the Japanese have often become a scapegoat/a channel for the energies of the Chinese 
nationalists (Shaw 1999). 
 The relevance of these most recent protests to our question is based on both their size, and on 
how they got their start. After the Tokyo metropolitan government agreed to purchase the islands 
(which were privately held by wealthy Japanese individuals) the dispute between the Chinese and 
Japanese ambassadors was made public on China Central Television, where the position of the 
government against the annexation of the islands was made (BBC 2012). Almost immediately 
afterwards, a swarm of discussion appeared on various Chinese microblogs, as well as larger ones such 
as Strengthening the Nation forum, calling for people to come to the streets and join in street protests. 
The message went viral, and August 19 became the preferred date for the protests (BBC 2012, Aug 16). 
It is interesting to note that many of the posts criticized the CCP’s handling of the Senkaku Islands 
situation, and called for more action to be taken against Japan, urging people to come out due to a 
perceived public duty to make their opinion known (BBC 2012, Aug 17). A number of posts were then 
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made expressing the need to meet up and protest the annexation of the Senkaku by the Japanese. The 
turnout to these protests was immense, highlighting just the amount of enmity held by the Chinese 
people against the Japanese.  
 The 2012 protests proceeded slightly differently than their 2005 counterparts because, whereas 
the government lagged behind in both coverage and criticism during the 2005 spouts, it actually took 
the lead in actively criticizing the Japanese actions regarding the islands in 2012, and in many ways tried 
to guide and control the protests. The incident was initially publicized when a Taiwanese coast guard 
ship was caught off the coast of the Senkaku by the Japanese coast guard, who asserted that the 
aforementioned ship was attempting to police the islands under its own control scheme, effectively 
suggesting their incorporation into Taiwanese territory on a public level. Days later, a small fishing boat 
filled with Hong Kong nationals landed on the Senkaku carrying a PRC flag, and attempted to jump off 
the boat and swim to the Senkaku, before getting caught by the Japanese coast guard (BBC 2012). This 
was also publicized by Xinhua, which released a press statement covering the “valiant efforts of the 
Chinese nationalists” and condemning the Japanese efforts much more strongly than they had before. 
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin actually echoed a common online phrase from the 2005 
Senkaku protests when he proclaimed that “No one will ever be permitted to buy and sell China's sacred 
territory (BBC 2012).”  
 As well, it is important to note the government intervention attempts that were observed 
during the protests. Guangzhou blogger Guen Yuanchow noted that he protested with a group of 
approximately 500-600 farmers that had ridden on a bus from Heibei province, a poor area where the 
citizens would not have been able to afford the sophisticated transportation or internet connection 
necessary to spontaneously organize in the way the protests demanded (Demick, Makinen 2012). He 
also noted that a number of protest ‘leaders’ –people with megaphones seen leading crowds- were later 
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identified by netizens as policemen out of uniform. Ai Weiwei himself commented that “much of these 
protests are staged”, including, allegedly, many of the posts calling for protest (Demick, Makinen 2012).  
 On the other hand, this supposed ‘astroturfed’ aspect of the protests is called into question by 
the internet-born diversity of many of the protest goals, and of the inability of the authorities to contain 
what eventually became mob-like riots. In many places, the protests took on a much more anti-CCP tone 
than their counterparts in 2005. Though the internet discussion was much more prolonged and varied in 
the 2005 protests, due in part to a perceived media complacency about Japanese actions in the UN, the 
street protests this time saw a common theme of discontent with what was viewed as the government’s 
‘soft’ attitude towards foreign policy issues. In Shenzhen, in particular, netizens organized a campaign of 
carrying posters of Mao Zedong and other paraphernalia of his reign, many of them accompanied by his 
own popular slogans on foreign policy. The Mao signs were meant to signify the protesters’ support for 
a leader perceived to be much more assertive and responsible on issues of foreign policy than the 
current regime, as he is classically billed in Chinese history classes as a hero who managed to quash 
foreign influence in the state and to assert Chinese socialism on a global scale. Accompanying these 
signs frequently were images of the ousted communist leader, Bo Xilai, as well, who is often used as a 
mouthpiece for anti-capitalist criticisms of the state in modern day China. Among other protests that 
appeared were protests for increased food safety measures by the state, calls to reduce corruption 
levels in the politburo, protests against income inequality, and protests against environmental 
degradation, which were particularly common in Beijing (Tang 2012). 
 Eventually, the protests came to a point where the police had to intervene, as in cities such as 
Beijing, they evolved into mass vandalism of anything Japanese, and Japanese-brand cars were 
especially targeted. What is interesting is how long these protests lasted despite being recognized by the 
police that were standing guard to monitor the protests. Occasionally, according to Liu, protestors 
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would be asked to leave or to take their signs down, but for the most part activists, including those 
wielding signs about controversial issues such as corruption, the environment, and even Bo Xilai, were 
allowed to continue on, so long as they grouped themselves with other nationalistic Chinese protestors. 
It appears, then, that even in moments of intense protests, the government will allow them as long as 
they maintain the nationalistic angle that was talked about previously. In fact, records show that many 
soldiers even kept flags during the protests which they passed out, mostly to protestors complaining 
about the more controversial subjects. This suggests that the aim of the CCP may have actually been to 
help direct the protests towards a more nationalistic perspective, perhaps even reinforcing the 
aforementioned ‘Enclaves’ sedimentation of nationalistic sentiments.  
On the other hand, activities like car smashing were eventually forcibly put down when the 
protestors did not honor the pleas of the party to demonstrate against Japan peacefully. This suggests 
that, though there are elements of the protests which agree with the party’s positions, it is the degree of 
severity which the party has a problem with, and which has emerged as a problem (Martina, Jones 
2012).  
 What this suggests is interesting because, whereas the other physical protest examples trended 
more closely to the enclaves theory, the 2012 Senkaku protests have a very strong element of Google 
Doctrine material in them. It is true that the basis for the protests is the particular breed of jingoism that 
seems to nest and breed online; the fervor of the protests screamed against the annexation of ‘sacred 
Chinese territory’ in the event of the Japanese government purchasing a piece of land it already 
technically owned. However, especially in the Shenzhen incident, many cities used these protests as 
direct methods of speaking out against the government, even as the government was attempting to 
organize the protests to its benefit. This suggests that, while online discussion certainly acted to spruce 
up ideological fodder for the protests, it ultimately did not elicit as strong of conformity as the Enclaves 
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theory might predict. Instead, as per those cyber-optimists that state that the emergence of a civil 
society will change the relationship between the government and the people, the netizens used the 
protests to make a political statement. This suggests that, while strongly at work, there are limitations of 
the Enclaves theory, and hitherto unrecognized strengths in the Google Doctrine theories.  
V) Conclusion 
After reviewing the evidence, the answer to the question of how social media reflects political 
opinion and participation falls somewhere in between the two theories. In conclusion, it seems that, 
between the two theories, Enclave Extremism is most represented in the workings of Chinese internet 
discussion, but only up to a certain extent. As predicted in instances where people already had 
predispositions towards certain beliefs, such as in the 2005 protests against Japan and in the activism 
against Carrefour in 2008, misinformation was not only easy to spread online, but it was accepted as fact 
by enough people to kick off large scale protests and online movements. In instances such as online 
censorship, however, where reality conflicted enough with the ‘official opinion’, enclave extremism was 
not able to gain a foothold and, as evinced by online movements to protest against internet censorship, 
the opposite effect can take place. This suggests that opinions, while they certainly can be influenced by 
a perceived internet intellectual majority, must have at least some strength to be influenced by the 
processes described in the Enclaves theory. When reality conflicts too much with these processes, even 
if they are backed by official opinion and an artificial majority, they gain no traction.  
While the Enclaves theory is certainly at play, however, certain aspects of the ‘Google Doctrine’ 
theories do show up in the way that the netizen activists approach their relationship with the Chinese 
government. The willingness of activists, in cases such as the protests against London Metropolitan 
University, to petition the government to change its behavior seems to come from a belief that the 
activists have a responsibility to care for the welfare of Chinese society when they perceive that the 
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government isn’t doing enough. This seems to emerge from internet discussion that lends a critical ear 
to the workings of the government (even if that ear comes loaded with misinformation), following the 
prediction of the Google Doctrine theories that suggest that the internet helps foster a somewhat 
democratizing, nascent civil society. This does not suggest, however, that the GD theories as a whole are 
valid; it simply means that one tenant seems to hold true, and that this tenant is still developed in the 
sorts of enclaves predicted by Sunstein and friends.  
At the moment all we can conclude, however, is that the construction of Chinese internet discourse 
seems to favor a flow of misinformation and radicalization. The eagerly debated question of whether or 
not it is a democratizing force remains to be seen. Based on the scale of protest movements born out of 
internet-charged public opinion, it would seem that the CCP does, indeed, need to contend with a public 
that is more reactive to political matters than it was before. But that does not mean that, under the 
right conditions, this process cannot reinforce loyalty to the state, or that the government cannot 
attempt to guide public opinion with a full understanding of these processes (a la its attempts during the 
2012 Senkaku Islands protests). If an informed guess as to the necessary conditions for democratization 
in China is to be taken, the Enclaves theory that has here been validated suggests that, to break the 
monopoly of the official opinion on democratic discourse, reality must contrast sufficiently with the 
argument that the CCP’s hegemony is a superior method of government to a democracy. What that 
would mean for Chinese society, however, is another matter entirely.  
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